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ROMER v. EVANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
HIGHER LAWMAKING
Anthony M. Dillof *
I. INTRODUCTION: WHEN CONSTITUTIONS COLLIDE
State constitutions are rarely of interest to the United States
Supreme Court. The reason follows from the nature of constitutions.
Constitutions, most fundamentally, do two things: (1) establish
structures and procedures for the enactment of substantive legisla-
tion; and (2) recognize rights which may limit such substantive
legislation. With respect to a constitution's empowering aspect, it is
the enacted legislation, not the underlying empowering provisions,
that is the usual subject of judicial review.' With respect to a
constitution's rights-recognizing provisions, these provisions restrain
legislation and the failure to enact is generally not subject to judicial
review. Accordingly, when the rare case arises in which the
Supreme Court turns its attention to a state's constitution, those
interested in how the federal constitution interacts with its state
counterparts should attend closely.
In Romer v. Evans,2 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
a recently adopted provision of Colorado's Constitution.3 Under the
provision, no governmental entity in Colorado could prohibit
discrimination based on homosexuality.4 The Court's decision,
however, focused neither on the fact that homosexuals were the
group burdened, nor that the burden at issue was exposure to
discrimination. Rather, the Court noted that the challenged
provision denied a group recourse to ordinary legislative political
processes and had other problematic features frequently associated
J.S.D. Candidate, Columbia University School of Law. A.B. 1981, Harvard University; J.D.
1985, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M. 1996, Columbia University School of Law.
I am grateful to Michael Dorf for his comments on a draft of this Article.
1 See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1054-60 (1986) (discussing
judicial review and the role the courts play in evaluating the constitutionality of government
acts).
2 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
3 See id. at 1629.
4 See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b).
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with constitutional provisions.5 Evans thus is potentially relevant
to the judicial review of much of state constitutional law.
The purpose of this Article is to review Evans to see what
significance it may have for the constitutionality of higher-lawmak-
ing generally and state constitutional law specifically.' As will be
shown, Evans offered the Court the opportunity to clarify an
ambiguous line of cases concerning the structuring of state political
processes. Of commensurate importance, it offered the Court the
opportunity to subject homophobia and anti-gay prejudice to the
scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause.7 In light of these opportu-
nities, it is unfortunate that the Court in Evans chose a route to its
conclusion that appears more a product of expediency than reasoned
elaboration. Nevertheless, in driving to its conclusion, the Supreme
Court left a trail of remarks suggesting aspects of a doctrine for
analyzing state constitutional law. While ultimately unfulfilling,
these remarks add to the stock of analytic concepts that must be the
basis of a more complete understanding of the constitutionality of
higher lawmaking.
II. BACKGROUND: A CASE OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS
A. Contending Perspectives
When Evans reached the United States Supreme Court, many had
great expectations for its outcome.8 Evans was a high-profile case
concerning an intrinsically controversial matter with a potentially
wide impact.9 The decision below ° was groundbreaking. The case
See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
6 For a discussion of "higher lawmaking," see infra text accompanying notes 128-33
(discussing the broad impact of higher lawmaking by virtue of its restraint on subordinate
political institutions).
7 The sodomy statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was not
challenged on equal protection grounds. See id. at 196 n.8.
' See Jeffrey A. Roberts, Gays Equate Court Battle to Brown vs. Board of Ed., DENV. POST,
Feb. 22, 1995, at A4 (quoting one of the Evans plaintiffs declaring, "This is our Brown."); see
also Daniel A. Batterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process, Levels of
Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV.
915, 979 (1995) (expressing the hope that the Supreme Court "will welcome members of the
gay community as equal participants in the American political process").
' See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and
the Trial of Colorado's Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057, 1060-61 (1994) (describing
the "[niational [riesponse to Amendment 2"); see also Michael J. Gallagher, Amendment 2, 4
LAw & SEXUALITY 123, 187-89 (1994) (discussing the possible effects of Amendment 2
throughout the nation).
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had generated extensive scholarly commentary available to the
Court." Furthermore, in its factual simplicity, Evans presented the
Court with constitutional issues of rare depth and difficulty. In
particular, Evans presented contending perspectives on the institu-
tion of higher lawmaking. 2 For these reasons, Evans had all the
makings of a landmark constitutional case.
Evans arose out of a single section of the Colorado Constitution.
On November 3, 1992, the citizens of Colorado had amended their
state constitution by adding the following provision:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in
all respects self-executing. 13
The amendment had two effects. First, it immediately nullified a
variety of existing measures prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 4 These measures included a handful of munici-
10 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Evans 1].
" See, e.g., Pamela Coukos, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs-The Amendment 2 Litigation,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 588-95 (1994) (noting the difficulties underlying the formalistic
fundamental rights evaluation of Evans); Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual
Rights and Citizen Initiatives: Is Constitutionalism Constitutional? 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 93, 107-16 (1995) (discussing the court's application of precedent in Evans as a
means of finding a basis of Amendment 2's abridgment of fundamental rights); Gallagher,
supra note 9, at 171-87 (arguing for heightened scrutiny on the basis of suspect class,
fundamental rights and suspicion of popular initiatives); Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1063-79
(detailing the arguments presented supporting and opposing Amendment 2); Sue Chrisman,
Commentary, Evans v. Romer: An "Old" Right Comes Out; 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 523-48
(1995) (analyzing the Evans decision against the intent of the Framers and precedent
protecting the fundamental right to participate in the political process); Batterman, supra note
8, at 927-32, 959-78 (evaluating the difficulties and potential abuses of Amendment 2's
homosexual class identification); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 167-77 (1993) (discussing the positive and
negative ramifications of recognizing homosexuality as a suspect class); Stephen Zamansky,
Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals'Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 221, 241-57 (1993) (describing societal views of homosexuality and advocating for
treating homosexuals as a suspect class).
12 See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1273-74.
13 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b).
14 See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1284-85 (noting the various statutes affected by Amendment 2);
Zamansky, supra note 11, at 221 n.3 (discussing the statutes repealed by Amendment 2).
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pal ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
in housing, employment and other contexts, as well as certain
statewide protections concerning health insurance and civil service
employment.'" Second, the amendment raised an absolute barrier
to the future enactment of such measures or any others that would
protect gays" from discrimination based on their sexual orienta-
tion.'7 Although further consequences of Amendment 2 were
alleged, the Supreme Court of Colorado either rejected these
allegations or did not reach them."
Colorado's Amendment 2 immediately suggests powerful argu-
ments both for and against its constitutionality. The argument for
its constitutionality turns on the constitutionally weak nature of the
interests burdened.19 Within the context of existing jurisprudence,
gays have no right to be protected from private discrimination based
on their sexual orientation.20 The Constitution provides no explicit
guarantee of such protection. 21  Regarding judicially developed
rights, these may be divided into unconditional and conditional
ones. 22  The rights emanating from the Due Process Clause are
negative: for example, the right to obtain a privately-funded abortion
under certain circumstances or the right to be free of impediments
See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1284-85 & n.26.
16 For ease of exposition, I shall generally use the terms "gay" and "homosexual" to describe
male homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals and others who might fall within the group burdened
by Amendment 2.
" See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Gallagher, supra note 9, at 124; Goldberg,
supra note 9, at 1058 n.3; Zamansky supra note 11, at 221. But see Duncan & Young, supra
note 11, at 96 n.6 (listing other communities that have "recently voted to reject special rights
for homosexuals").
18 One area of contention was whether Amendment 2 would nullify policies of general
application to the extent they applied to homosexuality. Under such an interpretation, if a
government agency had generally prohibited its supervisors from discriminating against
employees based on their off-duty conduct, the supervisors would now be free to discriminate
based on homosexual off-duty conduct. The Colorado Supreme Court apparently rejected such
an interpretation. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994) [hereinafter
Evans Ill.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
20 See Developments in the Law--Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508,
1575-84 (1989) (discussing the lack of legal protection from discrimination based on sexual
orientation in private employment).
21 See id. at 1576 (stating that the constitutional protections which limit public employers'
ability of hire and fire at will are not extended to private employers).
22 See Deborah S. James, Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the Fundamental Right
to Vote, 96 YALE L. J. 1615, 1624-26 (discussing fundamental rights generally and explaining
the difference between conditional and unconditional rights in the context of the right to travel
and the right to an abortion).
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on interstate travel.23 Protection from private discrimination thus
would not be an aspect of substantive due process.24 The Equal
Protection Clause can generate affirmative rights conditionally:
where the government offers a benefit to some, it may be required to
offer it to others.25  Protection from anti-gay discrimination,
however, is generally not a potential affirmative right. If a state
prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion
and sex, for example, it need not prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation.26  The Civil Rights Act of 196427 prohibits
discrimination based on some characteristics, but not sexual
orientation.28 It seems indisputable that this limitation does not
render the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. Therefore (so the
argument goes), because Colorado was free never to enact gay
antidiscrimination legislation, it should be free to adopt a constitu-
tional amendment precluding the enactment of such legislation. The
failure to enact gay discrimination legislation has the same effect
whether the failure is caused by a lack of legislative will or the
action of a prohibitory constitutional amendment. Furthermore, a
failure to enact antidiscrimination legislation and the adoption of a
constitutional amendment prohibiting such discrimination may both
2 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions
of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 734-37 (1981) (explaining the difference between positive and
negative rights); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding that the right
to interstate travel may not be infringed by denying welfare benefits to individuals who had
resided in a jurisdiction for less than one year).
24 See Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional
Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 381, 448 (1994) (stating that the
holding of the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "has led to extreme
extrapolations").
25 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864,
880-81 (1986) (discussing the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause). Professor Currie indi-
cates that "tying the rights of the minority to those of the dominant group seems the practical
equivalent of creating an affirmative duty of protection- .. " Id. at 881.
26 See Joel W. Friedman, Fair Employment Legislation in Louisiana: A Critique of the 1983
Act and a Proposed Substitute Statute, 58 TUL. L. REV. 444, 444-47 (1983) (discussing Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and "explaining the scope of protection offered under federal laws" from
discrimination in employment). Cf Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States:
Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American
Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 537-38 (1993) (indicating that "Title VII leaves state and
local governments free to adopt prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination" because
"Title VII erects no bar to state regulation in areas untouched by federal law").
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
See generally Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and African Americans: Personnel
and Policy Transformations, 36 How. L. J. 139, 154 (1993) (discussing the constitutionality of
various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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be the result of the belief that discrimination based on homosexuality
is not sufficiently wrongful to warrant prohibition.29 Where the
effects and underlying motives are the same, why should there be a
constitutionally significant distinction between simply failing to
enact antidiscrimination legislation (undoubtedly permitted) and not
enacting such legislation due to a provision of the state constitution
(allegedly impermissible)?
Indeed, there is an even stronger argument for the constitutional-
ity of Amendment 2. Imagine that in State X the authority of
localities to enact antidiscrimination legislation is in doubt. A
constitutional amendment is then adopted permitting such local
legislation on behalf of minorities, women, veterans, the aged and
the disabled. Then a second amendment is adopted adding homo-
sexuality as a new classification that localities may include in
antidiscrimination legislation. The second amendment appears to be
no more constitutionally mandated than the expansion of
antidiscrimination legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
to include sexual orientation. Furthermore, it seems to follow that
such an amendment, if adopted, could be freely repealed. The
Constitution, it may be argued, does not establish "trap doors" which
allow states to pass in one direction but not back out. If such a
hypothetical repeal is possible, how does it differ from the adoption
of Amendment 2 which also removes from localities the power to
adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination based on homosexuality?
These arguments, however, are at odds with an equally attractive,
but opposite, perspective on Amendment 2. In any democracy, the
right to vote is fundamental."0 The Constitution has been interpret-
ed as providing stringent protections for this right.3" The right to
vote, however, is only as good as the set of options to vote on.32
Precluding a candidate from being on the ballot effectively nullifies
the voting rights of her supporters as much as allowing the candi-
date on the ballot and precluding her supporters from voting for her.
2 See Duncan & Young, supra note 11, at 94 n.7 (arguing that "homosexuals already have
the same rights everyone else has" and that "homosexuality is merely one of countless
activities left unprotected by antidiscrimination laws").
'0 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is
a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.").
" See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307-09 (1966) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965), and the "stringent
new remedies for voting discrimination" created by the Act).
2 See Blair T. O'Connor, Note, Want to Limit Congressional Terms? Vote for "None of the
Above", 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 367 (1994) (indicating that Americans are "[tired of entering
the polling booths and having to choose between the lesser of two evils").
[Vol. 60
Similarly, if a group is precluded from obtaining legislation it
supports, its right to seek such legislation through voting or other
participation in the political process is worthless. Legislation
explicitly disenfranchising gays would undoubtedly be unconstitu-
tional in Colorado.33 Amendment 2 (so the argument goes), by
precluding legislation favorable to gays, functionally disenfranchises
gays.3 4
B. The Decision Below
Between these two perspectives on the constitutionality of
Amendment 2, the Colorado Supreme Court found the latter more
persuasive. In striking down Amendment 2, the Colorado Supreme
Court seized on the fact that it rendered gays alone unable to secure
protections from the ordinary political processes.3" In order to
obtain antidiscrimination legislation, gays alone would have to
amend the constitution or use other extraordinary measures. 36
According to the court, Amendment 2 was unconstitutional because
it "expressly fences out [from the political process] an independently
identifiable group."3v The decision's core was the statement "that
the Equal Protection Clause ... protects the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process" and any attempt to
infringe on an independently identifiable group's right is "subject to
strict judicial scrutiny."38 In a subsequent decision, the court, not
surprisingly, found that Amendment 2 could not survive such
scrutiny.3 9
The Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning was doctrinally innova-
tive. No court had ever invalidated a statute or constitutional
" An argument that homosexuals could constitutionally be denied the right to vote might
be premised on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which permits homosexual sodomy
to be made a felony, and Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), which permits convicted
felons to be disenfranchised. Richardson, however, only applies to convicted felons, and
Colorado has repealed its criminal prohibition of sodomy. Thus, Colorado could not
constitutionally apply the lesser burden of disenfranchisement because it did not establish the
greater burden of a felony-level criminal sanction.
3' See Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal Protection
Challenges to the Right's Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055,
1092 (1994) (discussing Amendment 2's disenfranchisement of gays and commenting on the
Evans I decision).
s See Evans 1, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993).
a' See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1.
7 Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
'8 Id. at 1282.
" See Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
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provision like Amendment 2 explicitly based on a right so framed.4"
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision, however, was not an
instance of the exercise of unconstrained judicial power. Rather, the
Colorado Supreme Court rested its action on a synthesis of two
established lines of cases: those involving voting rights and those
involving government structuring.4' First, the court reviewed a
disparate set of voting rights cases such as Kramer v. Union Free
School District, No. 15,42 Reynolds v. Sims,4  Williams v.
Rhodes,"' and Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party.45 These cases, the court found, rested on a general principle
that "laws may not create unequal burdens on identifiable groups
with respect to the right to participate in the political process absent
a compelling state interest."46 In order to determine whether this
principle extended to Evans, the Colorado Supreme Court next
reviewed a set of cases it recognized as bearing "a much closer
resemblance" to the one before it.4" These cases included Hunter
v. Erickson,4' which invalidated an Akron, Ohio charter amendment
requiring only fair housing ordinances to be approved by the
electorate; Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 4 which
invalidated an initiative prohibiting local school districts from using
busing to desegregate; and Gordon v. Lance,"° which upheld a
statute establishing a supermajority requirement for increasing state
bond indebtedness or tax rates.
The meaning of these three cases may be fairly disputed. In
Hunter and Washington, the Supreme Court found that the Equal
Protection Clause required that strict scrutiny be applied to the
measures at issue.51 Strict scrutiny review is triggered by legisla-
tion that infringes upon fundamental constitutional rights or imposes
40 Cf Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence
of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 841, 911
(1995) (stating that the Evans Court expanded the list of fundamental rights).
41 See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1276-77.
42 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (restriction of election to residents with children or property within
the school districts).
43 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (malaportionment of the state legislature).
44 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (limitations on ballot access).
45 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (discrimination against minority parties).
4' Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279.
47 Id.
48 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
49 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
50 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
" See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-92; Washington, 458 U.S. at 484-87 (applying the Hunter
doctrine).
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burdens based on a suspect classification.52 As the Colorado
Supreme Court noted, Hunter and Washington contain language
suggesting the existence of a fundamental right to seek legislative
results unencumbered by restrictions from higher sources of law.
53
Such a right would subject Amendment 2 to strict scrutiny under the
theory that by prohibiting a category of legislation, Amendment 2
denied those favoring such legislation the right to equal participation
in the political process.54 Hunter and Washington, however, also
contain language suggesting that strict scrutiny was applied in each
case because a minority group's rights were being disproportionately
burdened.55
Ambiguous language, however, was not the primary objection to
reading Hunter and Washington as resting on a fundamental right
to participate in the political process. Rather, the responsible
cabining of this right was the challenge. Charter amendments and
statutes, such as those in Hunter and Washington, which limit the
power of political institutions to respond to the interests of those
within their jurisdiction, arguably distort the normal political
processes in a manner offending "[t]he Equal Protection Clause['s]
guarantee[] [of] the fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process."56 This feature, however, is not uncommon.
Instances of higher lawmaking frequently regulate and restrain
subordinate political institutions.57 The Bill of Rights, for example,
restrains the federal government from enacting a wide variety of
legislation and thus partially excludes those who would seek such
52 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
6' For example, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on the statement in Hunter that Akron
could "no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact
legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size." Evans 1, 854 P.2d 1270, 1279 (Colo. 1993)
(quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393). It also relied on the statement in Washington where the
Court adopted Justice Harlan's position in Hunter that governmental power must be allocated
based on a "general principle." Id. at 1281 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 470).
54 See id. at 1279.
" See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 ("[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew
and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority.");
Washington, 458 U.S. at 485 ("[W]hen the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism
used to address racially conscious legislation-and only such legislation-is singled out for
peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly 'rests on "distinctions
based on race."'") (citations omitted).
5 Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279.
57 See JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
A READER 224-25 (3d ed. 1994) (describing the expansion of the federal government's authority
over the states).
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legislation from the political process.58 If unqualified, the right to
equal participation in the political process would nullify the rights-
establishing provisions of state constitutions generally.5 9
The Colorado Supreme Court found the needed qualification of the
right to equal participation in Gordon v. Lance."° In Gordon, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
was not violated by a West Virginia constitutional amendment
requiring that political subdivisions obtain 60% voter approval before
incurring greater indebtedness or raising taxes.6' The Court
distinguished Hunter on the ground that "we can discern no
independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded
indebtedness over other forms of financing. Consequently no sector
of the population may be said to be 'fenced out' from the franchise
because of the way they will vote."62 The Court continued, stating
that "so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or
authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."63 On the basis of these
statements, the Colorado Supreme Court was able to arrive at its
holding that the fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process is abridged only when an "independently identifiable
class of persons" is "fenc[ed] out."64
The Colorado Supreme Court made little effort to clarify the scope
of the critical "independently identifiable class" limitation.65
However, three facts about the scope of an "independently identifi-
able class" were clear. First, by "independently identifiable," the
court meant identifiable independent of the legislation allegedly
denying the group's right of equal political participation.66 Second,
the set of independently identifiable classes was broader than the set
of "suspect classes," as that term is used in the equal protection
5 Cf Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) ("[T]he Bill of Rights removes entire areas of
legislation from the concept of majoritarian supremacy."); RONALD DWORKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES (1977), reprinted in GARVEY & ALEINIKOFF, supra note 57, at 23 (explaining that the Bill
of Rights protects individuals from the majority).
"' Cf Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by a rights-establishing
amendment to the California Constitution dealing with desegregation).
60 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
61 See id. at 7.
62 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at 7.
Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993).
See id.
6' See id.
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doctrine.67 If not, the right to equal participation would never be
needed for it would only apply where the burdening of a suspect
class had already justified the application of strict scrutiny.68
Third, "gay men, lesbians and bisexuals"6S-the group burdened by
Amendment 2-are an independently identifiable class.7v Although
the court presented no argument for this proposition, it is implicit in
its decision.7'
The effectiveness of independent identifiability as a limit on the
fundamental right of equal participation is questionable. It is not at
all clear what classes are not independently identifiable and exist
only as a result of being the object of legislation. Gordon provides
the example of those who favor bonded indebtedness over other
forms of financing.7 2 Yet doctors, lawyers, the poor, the divorced,
pet owners, high school dropouts, veterans, those who have inherited
more than a million dollars, those with hunting licenses, and an
unlimited number of other classes, all seem to be independently
identifiable classes, and yet seem potential targets of constitutional
amendments. The class of independently identifiable classes seems
itself fatally difficult to identify and delimit. Furthermore, the
criterion of independent identification appears easily circumventable.
If Amendment 2 had prohibited the enactment of legislation merely
banning discrimination "on the basis of homosexual conduct," would
the class fail to be independently identifiable on the ground that a
widely varied class of persons beyond "homosexuals" may have
engaged in at least isolated instances of homosexual conduct? 3 In
this manner, the Colorado Supreme Court extended the Reitman-
Hunter-Washington-Gordon line of cases to the point of instability.
67 See id. at 1283-84.
68 See id. at 1283.
69 Id. at 1285.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 1284-86 (discussing the effect of Amendment 2 on gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals, and the necessity for strict scrutiny review).
72 See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 3 (1971).
7' Cf Watkins v. Unites States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1434-38 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
scope of the Army's ban against homosexuals, defined in part as "'person[s], regardless of sex,
who engage[] in, desire[] to engage in, or intend[] to engage in homosexual acts .... A
homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between
soldiers of the same sex for sexual satisfaction." (citation omitted)).
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III. READING ROMER V. EVANS
On May 20, 1996, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Romer
v. Evans. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court, splitting six-to-three along ideological lines.74
Representing the Court's less conservative wing, Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinion.7" The more conservative wing, lead
by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented.76
Perhaps the most immediately striking feature of the majority's
opinion is its brevity. The opinion is approximately one-sixth as long
as the writings of the Colorado Supreme Court77 and one-fourth as
long as Justice Scalia's dissent. Indeed, less the introduction, factual
background, summary of the decision appealed from, and rhetorical
closing," the opinion runs but seventeen paragraphs. Many of
these read as padding: a boiler plate exposition of equal protection
law, a general survey of modern discrimination statutes, and dicta
discussing the potential reach of Amendment 2." If an uncontested
detailing of the legal effects of Amendment 2 and a reply to a case
cited by the dissent are also put aside, ° there are only approxi-
mately six remaining paragraphs of argument and analysis.
The second striking feature of the majority opinion is that it
contains no discussion of the two points generally thought to provide
the most promising foundation for striking down Amendment 2.
First, the majority's analysis makes no reference to the Reitman-
Hunter-Washington-Gordon line of "equal political participation"
cases. Because these cases also involved the review of measures
restraining the legislative process, they had been viewed by the
Colorado Supreme Court as providing the closest analogies to the
challenge to Amendment 2.8" Nevertheless, except to note that they
7 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620, 1623 (1996).
7 See id.
7 See id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis of Amendment 2 comprised two opinions. The
first, Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), concerned the level of scrutiny that was to be applied
to Amendment 2; the second, Evans H, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), concerned whether
Amendment 2 survived that level of scrutiny.
7" See Evans, 116 U.S. at 1623-24, 1629.
79 See id. at 1625-27.
80 See id. at 1626, 1628.
81 See EvansI, 854 P.2d at 1279-86 (discussing the Reitman-Hunter.Washington-Gordon line
of cases).
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had been relied on by the court below, they are ignored.8" Second,
in the crucial analytic sections of the opinion, the Court attaches no
significance to the fact that gays were the group targeted by
Amendment 2.83 Gays are a group defined by a characteristic
which they have little, if any, control over and which is generally
irrelevant to their capabilities. They are stigmatized, stereotyped,
hold disproportionately few political offices and have historically
been subject to discrimination. 4 Many have thus argued that
homosexuality should be a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 5
Although lower courts have consistently rejected this position,86 the
question was ripe for the Court. Furthermore, even if the Court was
not inclined to grant homosexuals such status, the above facts about
homosexuality and its place within our society could have been given
some significance in the course of the Court's reasoning. The closest
the Court came was its observation that most people other than gays
are either protected from discrimination or do not need this
protection.87 Although this observation might support an argument
that Amendment 2 irrationally targets the group that is most in need
of antidiscrimination legislation, the Court did not employ the
observation in the part of its opinion that argues for Amendment 2's
unconstitutionality.8" In that part of the opinion, the Court merely
noted that the group affected by Amendment 2 is one whose
members are defined by their "status"89 or a "single trait."90  No
82 See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
83 See id. at 1627-29.
'4 See Zamansky, supra note 11, at 244-45.
'5 See, e.g., id. at 249-54 (arguing that homosexuals should be deemed a suspect class);
Rankin, supra note 34, at 1073-79 (arguing that homosexuals meet all of the criteria of a
suspect class); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1297-309 (1985) (proposing that courts recognize
homosexuality as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
86 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266-67
(6th Cir. 1995); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); National Gay
Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984) (2-1
decision), affd by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
87 See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
68 See id. at 1628-29.
89 See id. at 1629.
'0 See id. at 1628.
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mention was made, however, of what this status or single trait is or
what its significance might be.0'
Declining to pursue the analyses most closely at hand, the Court
advanced an argument that was simultaneously novel and pedestri-
an. Throughout the Evans litigation, the central question had been
whether Amendment 2 should be subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny under equal protection doctrine. 2 The majority in Evans,
however, did not need to reach this question because it found that
Amendment 2 failed even the rational relation test.9" The Court
rested this finding on two "related" grounds.94
The first ground discussed by the Court is the more obscure one.
According to the Court, Amendment 2 is "peculiar," "unprecedented"
and "not within our constitutional tradition."9" Hence it "defies"
and "confounds" normal rational basis means-end review.9 6  The
Court apparently found that Amendment 2 had some unusual
feature which rendered the rational basis test inapplicable or
inappropriate. At this point, it is useful to conceptualize Amendment
2 as having horizontal and vertical components.97 The horizontal
component concerns the consequences that Amendment 2 has on the
substantive, or first-order, interests of Colorado citizens. For
example, gays will likely find it more difficult to obtain employment,
and those resident landlords who oppose homosexuality will be able
to live in an environment without the presence of those who are
openly gay. The vertical component of Amendment 2 concerns the
consequences it has on the political, or second-order, rights of
Colorado's citizens. For example, citizens will no longer have the
legal power to enact gay anti-discrimination legislation to make it
easier for gays to obtain employment or to prevent landlords from
9' See id. at 1628-29.
92 Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994) (reaffirming the court's previous holding that
the strict scrutiny standard of review is applicable); Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-82 (Colo.
1993) (concluding that strict judicial scrutiny is applicable when the "right to participate
equally in the political process" is at issue).
"3 See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
14 See id. at 1628.
95 Id. at 1627-28.
96 See id.
"' Cf Craig Cassin Burke, Note, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the Normal
Political Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment Two, 69 IND. L. J.
275, 287-88 (1993) ("[Tlhe arm of equal protection ... has essentially two axes of application:
a horizontal axis, which mandates equality in state action in all branches of government, and
a vertical axis, which governs the method by which decision-making power may be allocated
along the governmental hierarchy." (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-17 (2d ed. 1988))).
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excluding openly gay tenants. It is not clear, however, which
component is more relevant to the Court's view that Amendment 2
was so unusual as to defy conventional analysis.
In explaining its response to Amendment 2, the Court remarked,
"[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board."9" The Court thus likens Amendment 2 to a statute contain-
ing ill-matched elements.99 Such ill-matched elements create first-
order burdens that are not rationally connected to the goals sought
to be achieved. °° In particular, the discrimination against gays
that Amendment 2 permits may be too broad to serve a rational
end.101 This characterization of the horizontal aspect of Amend-
ment 2, however, suggests that it will be particularly vulnerable to
rational basis review, not that it will "confound[]" or "deify]" it. 10 2
The Court's next remark is perhaps more telling: "The resulting
disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific
protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence."0 3
Here the Court appears to emphasize the vertical aspect of Amend-
ment 2, i.e., its effects on the political, as opposed to substantive,
rights of gays. This emphasis continues in the Court's subsequent
remarks:
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to
our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open
on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance .... A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws
in the most literal sense."0 4
If the Court was indeed focusing on Amendment 2's vertical
component, its claim that Amendment 2 is "unprecedented" remains
98 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
" See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2, 16-4 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing rationality, underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in the context of equal
protection).
100 See id. (identifying equality as the original goal of equal protection, but recognizing that
practical considerations have modified that goal to a reasonable purpose standard).
101 See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
102 See supra text accompanying note 97.
103 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
104 Id.
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obscure. The obvious precedent for improper tampering with the
right to seek aid from the government was the legislation considered
in the Reitman-Hunter-Washington-Gordon line of equal protection
cases.' °5 These cases at least begin to give content to the proposi-
tion that the government must "remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance."' °6 Without such elaboration, the
Court's reliance on the principle that the government must remain
open on impartial terms is empty. Every power-limiting provision of
a state constitution limits the ability of a legislature to respond to
those who seek its assistance in a particular area. Furthermore, the
Court's appeal to the "most literal sense" of the denial of equality is
also puzzling.0 7 The Court has often stressed that because all
laws create categories and hence inequalities, the Equal Protection
Clause cannot be applied literally.' 8 It would seem to make no
difference that political rights are involved. In even the extreme
case of a law prohibiting those of group X from voting, the law would
not be invalidated on the ground that it was a literal denial of equal
protection. Rather, the justification for singling out that group would
have to be assessed. For some groups, e.g., resident aliens, convicted
felons or minors, such a justification might exist.' 9 The Court's
10 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Gordon v. Lance, 403
U.S. 1 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967).
'06 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
.0? See id.
108 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Of course, most laws differentiate in some
fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifica-
tions." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)).
10' The Court's argument that Amendment 2 violates the literal sense of the Equal
Protection Clause echoes arguments advanced by Professor Tribe and others in their amicus
brief in Evans. See Richard C. Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed?, A.B.A.J., July 1996, at 30
("Tribe contends that the Court relied on [a per se violation] when it found the Colorado
amendment 'confounds the normal process of judicial review'. . . ." (citation omitted)). Accord-
ing to the brief, "Amendment 2 is a rare example of a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.... Its facial unconstitutionality flows directly from the plain meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's text." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 1995 WL 862021. Tribe attempts
to analogize Amendment 2 to a law that removes a group from the protections of the criminal
law. See id. at 4. Yet even such a law would not be treated as a per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. For example, the exclusion of children from the protection of criminal
assault laws would not be treated as a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather
the state's justification for such an exception-perhaps involving the claim that the existing
laws improperly deter the use of corporal punishment by parents-would have to be evaluated.
Indeed, a state's justification for excluding a group from the protection of criminal homicide
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first ground for striking down Amendment 2 thus offers the reader
little of substance.
The Court's second ground for striking down Amendment 2
appears to return the focus to the "horizontal" consequences of
Amendment 2. The Court described its objection to Amendment 2 as
"conventional" and "venerable."" ° According to the Court, Amend-
ment 2 is constitutionally flawed because it fails to "bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.""' Among the
justifications Colorado offered for Amendment 2 were: (1) it protects
the "freedom of association [of] landlords [and] employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality;"" 2 and (2) it
allows Colorado to redeploy its resources from preventing anti-gay
discrimination to preventing other forms of discrimination that are
more pernicious."' The Court rejected these justifications, howev-
er, on the following grounds:
The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a
status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state
interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not
permit.1
4
The Court's analysis must be described as entirely conclusory.
Under the rational relation test, "a law will be sustained if it can be
said to advance a legitimate government interest .... "' Accord-
ingly, a law may be struck down if: (1) its purpose is an illegitimate
one; or (2) it is not sufficiently likely that the law can achieve its
purpose.1 6 With respect to the question of the legitimacy of
Amendment 2's alleged purposes, the Court does not appear to take
the position that protecting freedom of association or redeploying
laws would have to be evaluated at least. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995)
(evaluating law removing certain terminally-ill patients from protection of law prohibiting
assisted suicide).
110 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
... Id. (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988)).
112 See id. at 1622.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 1629.
- Id. at 1627.
116 See id.
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resources are illegitimate government purposes. One could imagine
an argument that protecting the liberties of those who do not want
to associate with gays for personal or religious reasons is tantamount
to endorsing irrational animus. As the Court earlier stated, "desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.""7  The Court, however, never discussed
unconstitutional animus or illegitimate purpose in the context of
landlords' and employers' so-called liberty interests. Equating bias
and aversion to homosexuality-a proclivity to conduct that the
Court has held can be criminalized" 8-would be a significant
doctrinal development. Based on the Court's general silence in this
regard, it would be difficult to argue that such a development has yet
occurred. The alleged purpose of reallocating resources toward
combating other forms of discrimination seems on even surer ground.
Even if it were granted that freedom from associating with gays is
an interest unworthy of protection, it would not follow that prevent-
ing discrimination against gays is as worthy as preventing other
forms of discrimination. Comparing the worth of legitimate
legislative ends and determining what tradeoffs are rational are
tasks particularly outside the competence of courts." 9 Indeed, the
Court does not appear to argue that eliminating protection against
anti-gay discrimination in order to enhance protection from other
forms of discrimination is illegitimate.
The Court is also silent as to whether Amendment 2 advances
these ends. The Court simply makes no efforts to assess the effects,
or lack thereof, that Amendment 2 will have relative to its alleged
justifications. Even if the result of Amendment 2 would not be great
savings of anti-discrimination resources, it seems difficult to deny
that the liberty of employers and landlords who object to homosexu-
ality and who do not want to associate with homosexuals would be
directly enhanced.
Rather than criticizing Amendment 2 for failing to advance its
purported ends, the Supreme Court appears to charge it with
overbreadth. Regarding the purposes Colorado advanced, the Court
stated "[tihe breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
117 Id. at 1638 (citing United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rejecting justifications
based on irrational fear of mentally retarded).
"' See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
19 See generally, Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation and the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982) (discussing the role the
Court plays in construing statutory language).
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particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them."12 ° In an earlier related passage, the Court stated of
Amendment 2 that "its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus .... .121 Breadth might be thought to be a
virtue in the context of the rational basis test. The broader the
statute, the more far-reaching its effects, and the more likely that
the statute will thereby have some effect that may be characterized
as the advancement of a legitimate governmental end. It is rare that
throwing in extra elements or expanding a statute's scope will
backfire and negate its effectiveness. Thus, in criticizing Amend-
ment 2 for its breadth, the Court may be adding a requirement that
the legislation exhibit a degree of fit. The requirement of fit is more
closely associated with intermediate level scrutiny.'22 The canoni-
cal formulation of intermediate scrutiny is that, in order to survive,
"a statutory classification must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective." 2 ' The "substantially related"
requirement seems different in kind from the narrower rational basis
"advancement" requirement. Theoretically, a means may not be
substantially related to an end which it advances if it advances that
end in a manner sufficiently tangential, indirect or minor compared
to its other effects. Evans' nudging of the rational relation test
toward intermediate scrutiny, however, need not be viewed as
collapsing the distinction. In United States v. Virginia,'24 decided
the same term as Evans, the Court arguably nudged intermediate
scrutiny toward strict scrutiny.'25
Even assuming the validity of importing a fit requirement into the
rational relation test, the question remains in what respect the Court
found Amendment 2 to be fatally overbroad. The difficulty in
answering this question lies in specifying some aspect of Amendment
120 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
121 Id. at 1627. The Court also wrote that "Amendment 2.... in making a general
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law,
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate
justifications that may be claimed for it." Id. at 1628-29 (emphasis added).
122 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (requiring that the state prove that its
statute allowing women over 18 and men over 21 to purchase beer was substantially related
to the goal of reducing traffic accidents).
122 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); see Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (indicating that
classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
124 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
125 See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing the majority's use of its newly coined
"exceedingly persuasive justification" standard).
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2 that would not be present in the undeniably constitutional repeal
of a law protecting gays from discrimination. 126  For example,
Amendment 2 might be thought to be overbroad relative to its
associational justification because it would permit landlords to
discriminate against gay tenants even where, because of the size of
the apartment building, the landlord's associational interests would
not be significantly affected. Similarly, Amendment 2 might be
thought to be overbroad relative to its resource-allocation justifica-
tion because it would permit employers to discriminate against gay
employees in jurisdictions where there was already excess capacity
of resources to combat other forms of discrimination. Yet the
identical overbreadth relative to these justifications would occur if a
statute or ordinance prohibiting housing or employment discrimina-
tion based on homosexuality were repealed. The repeal of such
ordinances has never been thought to be constitutionally barred.
The objectionable overbreadth of Amendment 2, therefore, must flow
from that fact that it is not merely a law repealing
antidiscrimination legislation, but an instance of higher lawmaking.
Greater breadth is a feature commonly associated with higher
lawmaking. As I use the term, "higher lawmaking" is not limited to
constitutional provisions, but applies to all laws regulating the power
of other institutions.'27 Higher lawmaking would thus include an
ordinary state law regulating the powers of municipalities to enact
local ordinances. Such higher lawmaking is characteristically
"constitutional" not because it requires supermajority approval, but
because it defines another institution's basic powers. Higher
lawmaking so defined is different in kind from a higher authority's
126 As a general matter, what is enacted should be repealable if the enactment was not
constitutionally mandated. See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982)
(IT]he Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation
or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."); Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 n.5 (1969) ("Thus we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing
[antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment."). Regarding Amendment
2, plaintiffs in Evans conceded that a simple repeal of the antidiscrimination ordinances
nullified by Amendment 2, even if repealed by general referendum, would be constitutional.
See United States Oral Argument at 45, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039),.
available in 1995 WL 605822.
127 My use of the term "higher lawmaking" differs from Professor Ackerman's use of the
term. For me, a law is an instance of higher lawmaking by virtue of its content; for Ackerman,
various abstract features of a law's enactment render the law "higher." Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991) (defining higher lawmaking by procedural rather than
substantive characteristics); Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 2121, 2159-66 (discussing and identifying the necessary components of higher
lawmaking).
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nullification of one or many specific laws established by a lower
political institution. In the case of higher lawmaking, not only are
the specific offending laws nullified, but so are an indefinitely
extended set of similar potential laws which the lower institution
previously had the power to enact. For example, if Amendment 2
were in force, there could be no legislation protecting gays from
discrimination in any setting, in any part of Colorado, for any reason.
Thus, no matter how severe or localized the problem, no matter what
type or how extensive the resultant benefits, no matter to whom such
benefits would accrue, no matter how narrowly tailored the legisla-
tion, the legislation would be prohibited. Such breadth may be
qualitatively greater than that associated with ordinary legislation.
While ordinary lawmaking concerns the range of conditions under
which a single statute might apply, higher lawmaking concerns the
range of conditions under which a range of possible statutes might
apply. 128
All higher lawmaking has this open-ended quality, and the Court
could not have intended to condemn all higher lawmaking. A
prohibition on "all laws abridging speech" has a sweep as potentially
as wide as one prohibiting "all laws protecting gays from discrimina-
tion based on their sexual orientation." Under Evans, the difference,
if there is one, must be that the latter places a burden on a group
defined by a "single trait"129 or "status."'3 ° An individual's favor-
ing of the abridgment of speech cannot reasonably be described as a
status or a trait of an individual. In general, there will be a tighter
fit between means and end when a statute is couched in functional
128 It is doubtful that the Supreme Court was concerned with the breadth of Amendment
2 with respect to its vertical component, i.e., its effect on the rights of gays to participate in
the political process. It may be asked why gays and only gays should be required to amend
the state constitution in order to secure protection from discrimination. The answer is
straightforward. The burden is not placed on groups such as blacks, jews, women and the
disabled because Colorado might constitutionally conclude that these groups, unlike gays,
should be protected from discrimination. Thus it is rational that they are not targeted by
Amendment 2. Moreover, the burden is not placed on other groups like teenagers, ex-felons,
or the poor, who the state might conclude should not be protected, because these groups have
not been successful in obtaining "undeserved" protection in some localities. Thus, there is no
reason for Amendment 2 to target them. This argument is, of course, premised on the
proposition that Colorado may constitutionally conclude that gays do not deserve protection
from discrimination, while other groups do deserve such protection. This proposition, however,
seems unassailable. The failure of antidiscrimination laws to prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation does not render them unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-30.
129 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
'30 Id. at 1629.
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or behavioral terms rather than in terms of the traits or status of an
individual.' For example, a constitutional provision that protects
religious behavior from unfavorable treatment is preferable to one
that protects religious individuals from unfavorable treatment.
Nevertheless, a rule that instances of higher lawmaking may never
constitutionally employ such devices seems too broad. Traits (e.g.,
health, honesty, age, gender, propensity for violence) or status (e.g.,
residency, military service, criminal record, wealth, birth place) are
sometimes immediately relevant and sometimes are perfectly good
proxies for other sorts of features. Nevertheless, under the stated
reasoning in Evans, higher lawmaking that burdens groups
identified by traits or status must be considered constitutionally
defective.132 It is difficult to believe that the Court intends to
apply such a sweeping rule consistently.
IV. Is No LAw BETTER THAN BAD LAW?
"[H]ard cases, it is said, make bad law."'33 For a majority of the
Court, Evans undoubtedly was a hard case. It was hard, first,
because Amendment 2 could not have been an appealing law.
Amendment 2 was a uniquely regressive step in our nation's battle
against discrimination.3 4  Even if the repeal of a civil rights
statute is constitutional as a matter of law, such repeals are rare as
a matter of practice.'35 It is even more rare that the permissibility
of discrimination is enshrined in a document as fundamental to a
community as a constitution.'36 At oral argument, Justice Kenne-
dy, the author of Evans, twice exclaimed that he had never before
131 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984)
(determining that a regulation which prohibits camping in a national park was narrowly
tailored to satisfy the government's interest in maintaining those parks). It is unlikely the
regulation would have been upheld if it excluded "demonstrators" or "the homeless" from the
park.
'32 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
's Exparte Long, 3 W.R. 19, 103 Rev. Rep. 850, 851 (1854).
'8' But see Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the
Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1646 n. 11 (1993)
(noting laws which prohibit discrimination in certain areas while simultaneously reserving to
the states the right to discriminate in other areas).
13' See Colleen G. Treml, Note, Zambro v. Baltimore City Police Department: Pushing
Plaintiffs Down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits, 68 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1015 (1990)
(noting the reluctance of the Supreme Court to repeal civil rights statutes).
13. See Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism:
A View from the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 259 n.125 (1996) (noting the equal rights
amendments of 16 state constitutions).
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seen a statute like Amendment 2.17 While novelty itself is no sin,
it provides a tempting target for those who are already inclined to
object in principle. Evans was a hard case, second, because striking
down Amendment 2 on the basis of either the group burdened or the
nature of the burden had the potential for far-reaching reverbera-
tions. 3 ' Finding that homosexuals were entitled to some special
constitutional status would have destabilized large chunks of existing
law-from the widespread criminalization of homosexual sodomy, to
the military's hostile treatment of gays, to the. limited rights of
homosexual life partners.'39 Alternatively, finding that higher
lawmaking restrictions on the ordinary political process denied equal
protection would have cast a shadow over significant portions of
states' constitutions. 40 Evans was hard, finally, because the lower
court had found Amendment 2 unconstitutional.'4 Thus, the
Court did not have available to it the option that would have allowed
it to most easily wash its hands of the matter. If the lower court had
upheld Amendment 2, the Court could have denied certiorari'42 or
simply have affirmed and so left undisturbed both the positions of
the parties and its own constitutional doctrine.
However, even if it was a hard case, Evans did not make bad law.
Instead, it made no law. Although I have suggested a reading of
Evans focusing on the higher lawmaking aspect of Amendment 2,
this reading is at best a scholarly reconstruction, i.e., an effort at
giving the best interpretation of a text. The best interpretation of an
opinion, however, need not necessarily qualify as a holding. To be
characterized as a holding, an interpretation must also fairly reflect
"' See United States Oral Argument at 4-5, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039), available in 1995 WL 605822.
... See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1060-61 (discussing the nationwide effect of Amendment
2).
139 See generally, David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
319 (1994) (analyzing the military's restrictions on homosexuals under the First Amendment);
Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance and
Containment 11, 97 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1993) (discussing homosexuality as it interacts with
sodomy and marriage statutes).
"4 See, e.g, Farabee, supra note 136, at 259 n.125 (discussing the equal rights provisions of
16 state constitutions).
141 See Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo. 1993).
142 Cf. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1984) (mem.) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (certiorari denied where school discharge of openly gay teacher found not to violate
fourteenth amendment); Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, (1977) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (certiorari denied where university's denial of recognition of gay student group
found to violate fourteenth amendment).
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a court's commitment to it. Where as here, the evidence is slight and
the interpretation attenuated, the requisite commitment should not
be found. Taken at face value, the opinion reached its conclusion in
a way that neither clarified old law nor provided a foundation for
future doctrine. The Court did not identify the respect in which it
found Amendment 2 unique, did not deny that Amendment 2 could
rationally be thought to advance legitimate governmental purposes,
and did not explain in what respect Amendment 2 was unconstitu-
tionally broad. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, it is
unclear what Evans stands for. This lack of clarity can be illustrated
by the following questions: After Evans, would a law like Amend-
ment 2 be upheld if (1) instead of gays, it applied to polygamists,143
the disabled, nonpracticing pederasts, the homeless, those with
moustaches, Nazis; (2) instead of legislation prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on homosexuality, it nullified legislation prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation generally; (3) instead of
being a constitutional amendment, it were an ordinary statute
enacted by the legislature;144 (4) instead of precluding all types of
antidiscrimination legislation, it merely prohibited employment,
housing or some other specific form of antidiscrimination legislation;
(5) instead of banning legislation on all levels, it merely precluded
municipalities from enacting gay antidiscrimination legislation; (6)
instead of completely banning gay antidiscrimination legislation, it
merely required supermajorities to enact it? The problem, of course,
is not that Evans fails to provide an answer to these questions. The
problem is that Evans fails to provide even a framework for
analyzing them.
The Supreme Court's application of the rational basis test in Evans
may be usefully contrasted to that in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.141 Cleburne was the last case before Evans in
which the Supreme Court held that an instance of state action failed
the rational basis test. In Cleburne, a Texas city had denied an
application for a special use permit that would have allowed a group
home for the mentally retarded to operate in a residential area.14
" Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether the Court has "concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate
concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not").
'" Cf Equality Found. ofGreater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 621(6th Cir.
1995) (upholding city charter amendment permitting discrimination against gays), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
14" 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
' See id. at 435.
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The Court considered a variety of justifications for the denial. To the
justification that those in the area harbored "negative attitudes"
toward the residents of the home, the Court responded that such
attitudes are "not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from [other multiple dwellings]" and
characterized such attitudes as "biases" and "irrational prejudice"
that could not justify state action.147 Such a rebuke contrasts
starkly with the moral neutrality of the Evans Court with respect to
"landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to
homosexuality."4 ' Regarding the justifications that the home
would be located in an area that was susceptible to floods, that it
would cause congestion in the area, or that the city might be liable
for actions of residents of the group home, the Court responded that
those justifications were not being equally applied to other types of
dwellings such as sanitariums, hospitals, and fraternities.149 As to
justifications concerning fire safety, density of occupants, and fire
hazards, the Court cited the home's compliance with state and
federal regulations and responded that there was no rationale for
singling out homes for the mentally retarded in these respects.' 50
Thus, the Cleburne Court provided a reasonably detailed presenta-
tion of the justifications advanced, as well as the irrational differenti-
ation on which they rested. By likening group homes for the
mentally retarded to other types of multiple dwellings, the Court
indicates the overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness that is
objectionable.' 5 ' In sum, the Cleburne Court was willing to stake
out a position in support of the mentally retarded and how they
should be treated relative to others. In Evans, the Court hides
behind a conclusory invoking of the rational basis test.
The opinion in Evans thus represents the Court's solution to the
problem of how to dispose of a distasteful statute while minimizing
immediate and interim costs. By saying little or nothing of sub-
stance, the Court avoided the political costs that might have been
associated with, for example, recognition of the suspect-class status
141 Id. at 448, 450.
14 Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
149 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50.
150 See id. at 450.
' See id. at 449-50 (indicating that if the residents of the home for the retarded were
instead a fraternity, family, home for the elderly or a health-care facility, no restrictions would
be placed on the building's occupancy).
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for gays or the irrationality of the desire not to associate with
gays." 2 Similarly, the Court avoided the interim costs associated
with the creation of a novel constitutional doctrine. Once created,
such doctrines tend to expand in unpredictable ways. 5 ' Articulat-
ing a doctrine sufficient to explain the fault in Amendment 2 might
have generated litigation in diverse areas including treatment of sex
offenders, civil rights, municipal home rule, voting access, domestic
law and the repeal of affirmative action plans. For every case
decided advancing individual rights, a dozen must be decided
defining the limits of the advance.' The Court correctly sensed
that adopting the Colorado Supreme Court's "independent identifi-
ability" test for unconstitutionality would have opened the door to a
barrage of litigation. Such litigation would likely have resulted in
wholesale abandonment of the criterion or identification of "indepen-
dent identifiability" with suspect class status-a result the Court was
not ready to endorse.
Opinions such as Evans, however, create long-term costs for the
Court. Repeated decisions without sufficient doctrinal basis weaken
the Court's ability to engage in judicial review. Commitment to
principles expressed in legal doctrine constrains courts and makes
them more than legislatures without constituencies. 5 Acting in
the absence of articulated principle, the Court ceases to be perceived
as a court.'56 In the long run, anarchy is loosed on the lower
courts as they despair of predicting the course of future decisions or
learn that they, too, need not articulate reasoning that could account
152 But see Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
failing to address whether Colorado had a rational basis for denying homosexuals special
protections).
153 See generally, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1763-64 (1991) (discussing the
unpredictability of new law in general).
114 See Rebecca C. Morgan et al., The Issue of Personal Choice: The Competent Incurable
Patient and the Right to Commit Suicide?, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1992) (discussing individual
rights and indicating that "[flundamental rights are not defined in the Constitution and have
to be defined by the court, and the Supreme Court has indicated a hesitance to redefine both
fundamental rights and what rights are considered to be fundamental" (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))).
"' See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95 (stating that when the Court acts without a commitment
to principles expressed in legal doctrine, it is acting beyond the constitutional authority
expressly delegated to the judiciary).
"6 See id. at 194 ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution.").
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for their decisions.'57 Cases like Evans, for example, may lead
lower courts to believe that they may use lack of rationality as a
basis for nullifying statutes when they are unable or unprepared to
formulate a more cogent rationale. Equally problematic is the
majority's failure to respond to the dissent's criticism. The dissent
in Evans was particularly scornful.'58 A majority, of course, is
never obliged to respond. Near total silence 59 in the face of direct
challenge, however, suggests a lack of conviction, a shallowness of
reasoning, or both.
V. CONCLUSION
When Evans reached the Supreme Court, a shadow lay over all
state constitutional provisions that might be characterized as
affecting an "independently identifiable group." After Evans, that
shadow has been lifted. But it has not been lifted through the
clarification of existing law or the dawning of a new doctrine. Rather
than illuminating any generally problematic features of state
constitutional provisions such as Amendment 2, the Supreme Court
struck it down with a lightning bolt. In its brevity, suddenness, and
unpredictability, there is no way of knowing where rational basis
scrutiny of the Evans-type will strike again-if at all.
... See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Posner, Prisoners and Pragmatism, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1117,
1165 (1992) ("When judges are candid about the grounds for their decisions, they not only give
lawyers and lower court judges more information about 'what really moves them,' making the
outcome of future cases more predictable, they also allow others to monitor their activities."
(citation omitted)).
... See Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's theory as
"ridiculous" and "unheard-of").
... In Evans, the majority's only response to the dissent was its attempt to distinguish a
case relied on by the dissent. See id. at 1628. Even here, however, the dissent is allowed the
last word. See id. at 1636 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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